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Abstract
Individual variability in emotion processing may be associated with genetic variation as well as with psychological
predispositions such as dispositional affect styles. Our previous fMRI study demonstrated that amygdala reactivity was
independently predicted by affective-cognitive styles (phobic prone or eating disorders prone) and genotype of the
serotonin transporter in a discrimination task of fearful facial expressions. Since the insula is associated with the subjective
evaluation of bodily states and is involved in human feelings, we explored whether its activity could also vary in function of
individual differences. In the present fMRI study, the association between dispositional affects and insula reactivity has been
examined in two groups of healthy participants categorized according to affective-cognitive styles (phobic prone or eating
disorders prone). Images of the faces of partners and strangers, in both painful and neutral situations, were used as visual
stimuli. Interaction analyses indicate significantly different activations in the two groups in reaction to a loved one’s pain:
the phobic prone group exhibited greater activation in the left posterior insula. These results demonstrate that affective-
cognitive style is associated with insula activity in pain empathy processing, suggesting a greater involvement of the insula
in feelings for a certain cohort of people. In the mapping of individual differences, these results shed new light on variability
in neural networks of emotion.
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Introduction
An important goal of integrating psychology and neuroimaging
is to understand the detailed mechanisms mediating inter-
individual differences in human behavior. Individual variability
in emotion processing may be associated with genetic variations as
well as with psychological predispositions [1–3]. In order to refine
the integration between genetics and psychology, more psycho-
logical tools would be useful in the attempt to grasp the complexity
of human variability. Several authors consider the dispositional
affect to be the predominant modality of emotional engagement
with the self and with the environment [4–10]. Our concept of
dispositional affect developed based on previous works on the
relationship between cognitive styles and attachment patterns [11–
15] in some psychopathological conditions [16–17]. It emphasizes
the need to account for the way in which each person, in dealing
with others and the different circumstances of everyday life, feels
situated in the environment [18–20]. Within this new perspective,
two general dispositional affects can be defined: primarily based on
basic emotions or primarily based on emotions which are co-
perceived through others (non-basic emotions) [18–20]. Subjects
with a better knowledge of basic emotions are said to have an
inward disposition (not to be confounded with introversion-see
below) [2–3,21–22]. Inward subjects tend to be more viscerally
aware, more sensitive in the detection of changes in bodily states
occurring during emotions and feelings. In brief, their focus is
primarily directed towards a frame of reference that predomi-
nantly uses a body-centered coordinate system [23–25]. Subjects
with a better knowledge of non-basic emotions, i. e. emotions that
require some kind of relationship between the self and external
points of reference, are said to have an outward disposition (not to
be confounded with extraversion -see below) [2–3,26]. Outward
subjects tend to be more externally aware, and in this sense, their
focus is primarily directed towards a frame of reference that
predominantly uses an externally-anchored coordinate system, i. e.
contexts, people or rules and norms [27–31].
Different dispositional affects could explain behavioral data on
field-dependent or independent perceptual processing [32], on
independent or interdependent self-construal [31,33], as well as
on variability of interoceptive sensitivity in emotional processing
[34–35].
Within these two general dispositional affects, five categories are
identified as affective-cognitive styles among which two are
particularly orthogonal: 1) phobic prone individuals (inward),
and 2) eating disorders prone individuals (outward). It is necessary
to underline that the terms phobic prone and eating disorders
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of pathological phobias or of eating disorders. Phobic prone
individuals rely predominantly on basic emotions and are
characterized by a sense of permanence of Self predominantly
centered on the visceral reading of emotional states. The
‘‘hypercognition’’ [21] of basic emotions (especially fear) plays a
central role in the development and regulation of a stable
perception of Self. In fact, the recurrent activation of basic
emotions is matched by a subjective experience of ‘‘gut feelings’’.
As a result these individuals tend to regulate their relationship both
with others and in accordance with the ongoing situations through
bringing internal states into focus, thereby allowing their personal
stability to coincide with the stability of their own bodily conditions
(body-bounded sense of self). Therefore the bodily-emotional
condition and its control (through various strategies) are centrally
salient to these individuals in regulating their emotional life. On
the other hand, eating disorders prone individuals are character-
ized by a sense of permanence of Self that emerges simultaneously
and in tune with the perception of a source of meaning [28,36–
37]. While this produces a recognition of one’s own internal states
stemming from a focus on the real or imagined other in ongoing
situations [29,38–39], at the same time the ‘‘outward’’ referent
becomes the source of information (perceived as source of
expectations, of judgment, of emulation or as a pole of opposition,
of challenge, etc.) to recognize one’s own emotional experience. In
this regard, eating disorders prone individuals tend to be more
socially aware and to regulate their personal stability on a
coordinate system which is outwardly anchored to a real or
imagined other. One effect of this situational and social interest is
that those emotions which emerge through mediated affective
engagement (non basic emotions) can change more easily -since
they tax the system’s visceral resources less– and with greater
flexibility with regard to the flow of ongoing events.
The insula plays a key role in homeostatic afferent activity that
engenders distinct subjective bodily feelings [40], and it is involved
in human feeling processing [41–44]. Therefore, its reactivity
could be associated with individual differences. Neuroimaging
studies have provided evidence for the direct involvement of the
insular cortex in the so-called ‘‘pain matrix’’ during empathy for
pain [45–53]. However, current debates on empathy have raised
unanswered questions about individual differences [54–55]. To
our knowledge, no fMRI studies have been conducted previously
with this objective. Therefore, the present study was carried out to
determine whether and how individual differences in affective-
cognitive styles are associated with insula reactivity during affective
empathic responses to directly perceived feelings of others.
With this objective, two groups of healthy subjects were
categorized according to their affective-cognitive style, phobic
prone or eating disorders prone. In order to study the role of the
affective-cognitive styles, salient visual stimuli depict a loved one,
in both painful and neutral expressions. Unfamiliar faces were
used as controls. We predicted greater insular cortex activity
associated with the subjective evaluation of their condition [40] in
the phobic prone subjects, because of their relatively greater focus
on a body-centered coordinate system as a frame of reference.
More precisely, we hypothesized that the activation of the insular
cortices during a visual experience of a loved one’s pain would
differ according to group.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Fifteen participants were phobic prone (PP) (6 females; mean
age 39.2; standard deviation [SD] 7.4) and 15 were eating
disorders prone (EDP) (5 females; mean age 34.4; standard
deviation [SD] 8.65). The couples enrolled had been together in a
committed relationship for the last three years and had been living
together for at least one year. To assign the participants to a
group, they were assessed with a semi-structured interview [2–3]
and the Personality Meaning Questionnaire (PMQ) [56] one
month before the scanning session. Concordance between the two
investigators was 100%. As in our previous study [2–3], the semi-
structured interview was administered independently by two
trained investigators who were blind to each other’s results. The
aim of the semi-structured interview was to assess the key themes
characterizing different affective-cognitive styles in the matter of
emotional activation, duration and regulation. The semi-struc-
tured interview was divided into three consecutive steps. The
subject was asked to give a detailed account of two meaningful
emotional experiences involving anger and fear. After the account,
the interviewer marked the characteristics of the appraisal,
regulation and duration of the emotional experiences. If necessary,
the interviewer asked for more details and then, the interviewer
assessed the underlying predominant affective-cognitive style. The
PP key themes detected were the tendency a) to focus on the
visceral bodily states once the basic emotions have been triggered
(automatic appraisal), b) to have the subjective perception of
inability to modify these emotions after they have been triggered
(duration), c) to have control over bodily-emotional condition
aimed at limiting the emotional intensity; fear in these subjects
lasts just as long as the perception of not being in control
(regulation). Instead, EDP key themes detected were the tendency
a) to focus on the outward referent recognized as the source of
one’s own emotional states (reflective appraisal), b) to have the
subjective perception of capability to rapidly change these
emotions by modifying the simultaneous focus on a different
point of reference (duration), c) to adjust their personal stability to
the perceived source of reference; being without a point of
reference is perceived by these subjects as a feeling of emptiness
(regulation). The PMQ questions on which PP subjects tend to
score higher identify a score of need for emotional over-control in
situations that may be felt as potentially dangerous (PP score) [56].
The questions on which EDP subjects score higher identify a score
for need for consent and approval, sensitivity to judgment, and
vulnerability to criticism (EDP score) [56].
A behavioral evaluation of how subjects in each group
processed empathy for pain was obtained through the Interper-
sonal Reactivity Index (IRI) [57] comprised of four subtests which
measure dispositional empathy based on the notion that empathy
consists of a set of separate but related constructs. In order to
support the behavioral characterization of each dispositional affect
style in terms of body perception, we also employed two subtests of
the Body Perception Questionnaire (BPQ) [58]: the ‘‘Awareness of
Bodily Processes’’ (ABP) and the ‘‘Autonomic Nervous System
Reactivity’’ (ANSR). The study was approved by the local IRB.
Subjects also completed a series of questionnaires identifying
different personality characteristics, such as the NEO Five Factors
Inventory [59], the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI)
[60], the Positive and Negative Attitude Scale (PANAS) [61], the
Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI) [62], and the Big Five
Questionnaire (BFQ) [63]. Other demographic variables included
years of education, parental socioeconomic status [64], total IQ
(assessed with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised
[WAIS-R]), and handedness [65] (Table 1). Exclusion criteria
included a history of drug or alcohol abuse, previous head trauma
with loss of consciousness, pregnancy, and any significant
medical or psychiatric conditions as evaluated with the SCID
interview.
Insula Activity and Individual Differences
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The present study was approved by the Comitato Etico
Indipendente Locale of the Azienda Ospedaliera ‘‘Ospedale
Policlinico Consorziale’’ of Bari. Informed written consent was
obtained from all participants before participation.
Functional MRI data
fMRI data were acquired on a 3T GE (General Electric,
Milwaukee, WI) MRI scanner with a gradient-echo echo planar
imaging (EPI) sequence and covered 26 axial slices (5 mm thick,
1 mm gap), encompassing the entire cerebrum and most of the
cerebellum (TR 2; field of view, 24 cm; matrix, 64664, a voxel
size of 3.7563.7565 mm). For each scan, a total of 330 EPI
volume images were acquired.
Visual Stimuli
Visual stimuli consisted of 160 pictures (7206576 pixels), 40 for
each condition, depicting faces of a loved one and of actors, in
both painful and neutral situations. Two professional actors, a
female and a male, were enrolled as models for the pictures of
unfamiliar faces (Figure 1). Facial expressions of actors and
partners were filmed in a session previous to scanning. Painful
facial expressions were elicited by mechanical stimuli during a pain
threshold test. Two investigators reviewed the videotaped
recordings and selected by consensus the picture frames conveying
evidence of the intensity of the experience of pain, based on
Ekman and Friesen’s Facial Action Coding System (FACS) [66].
General fMRI Procedures
Functional MRI scanning consisted of one run in an event-
related design. To optimize the stimulus sequence, we used a
genetic algorithm [67]. The exact timing of the occurrence of each
event was generated with the genetic algorithm, using an average
inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 1300 ms, equal numbers of on and
off events, and optimization for hemodynamic response detection.
Visual stimuli were presented for 1400 ms in a random order.
During the interstimulus interval (ISI), a crosshair was presented.
Total run time was about 11.2 minutes. Visual stimuli were
presented using Presentation 10.5 (www.neuro-bs.com). During
the scanning session participants were required to perform a
discrimination task between known and unknown faces, in both
painful and neutral situations. Responses were given via a button
box which recorded accuracy (i. e. percent correct responses) and
reaction time (measured in milliseconds). Before the scanning
session, each participant completed the STAI questionnaire [68]
Table 1. Questionnaire Scores for Phobic prone and Eating disorders prone Groups.
PHOBIC PRONE
(PP) n=15
EATING DISORDERS PRONE (EDP)
n=15
Questionnaires t value Mean SD Mean SD
IRI
Perspective Taking t=23.65 p,0.001 21 4.63 26 3.13
Fantasy t=21.50 p.0.14 21 4.34 24 4.17
Empathic Concern t=21.01 p.0.3 26 2.55 27 3.81
Personal Distress t=0.80 p.0.43 17 6.20 16 2.69
Body Perception Questionnaire
Awareness of Bodily Processes t=2.6 p,0.03 2.41 1.06 2.25 0.7
Autonomic Nervous System Reactivity t=1.39 p.0.10 1.68 0.44 1.39 0.48
Positive and Negative Attitude Scale t=1.4 p.0.17
Positive 33.1 3.4 32.0 8.7
Negative 19.1 9.0 20.0 7.2
Eysenck Personality Inventory t=0.8 p.0.4
Psychoticism 3.2 2.2 5.0 3.2
Extraversion 14.4 4.2 13.9 3.2
Neuroticism 8.7 4.9 9.8 5.8
NEO Five Factors Inventory t=0.5 p.0.62
Neuroticism 19.9 6.6 21.2 5.4
Extraversion 30.8 6.3 28.0 4.7
Openness 29.6 4.4 31.6 4.1
Agreeableness 29.0 4.7 31.1 6.4
Conscientiousness 31.3 6.3 29.6 5.7
Temperament and Character Inventory t=1.67 p.0.11
Harm avoidance 9.01 3.5 9.6 4.1
Novelty seeking 9.5 3.8 10.2 3.9
Reward dependence 10.2 6.5 9.3 3.2
Persistence 2.4 1.7 1.8 1.4
Underlined rows report significant differences between the PP and EDP groups. SD=standard deviation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015268.t001
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asked to rate the intensity of others’ pain and of their own feelings
of unpleasantness on the basis of the same visual stimuli by using a
computerized visual analogue scale (VAS) with target words
ranging from ‘‘no pain’’ to ‘‘extreme pain’’ and from ‘‘no effect’’ to
‘‘extreme unpleasantness’’. Participants were not informed of their
partners’ role in the study before the scanning session.
Image analysis
Images were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM5 (Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK), implemented
in MatLab 7.2 (MathWorks
TM). For each subject, functional
images were first slice-timing corrected, using the middle slice
acquired in time as a reference, and then spatially corrected for
head movement, using a least-squares approach and six-parameter
rigid body spatial transformations. They were then normalized
into a standard stereotactic space (Montreal Neurological Institute
MNI template) by using a 12-parameter affine model and spatially
smoothed with a three-dimensional Gaussian filter (10 mm full-
width at half-maximum).
Images were analyzed using a standard random-effect
p r o c e d u r e .T h et i m es e r i e so ff unctional MR images obtained
from each participant were analyzed separately. The effect of the
experimental paradigm was estimated on a voxel-by-voxel basis,
according to the general linear model extended to allow the
analysis of fMRI data as time series. Low-frequency noise was
removed with a high-pass filter (time constant 128 s). The onset
of each trial constituted a neural event that was modeled through
a canonical hemodynamic response function, chosen to represent
the relationship between neural activation and hemodynamic
changes. Serial correlation in thef M R It i m es e r i e sw a se s t i m a t e d
with a restricted maximum likelihood (ReML) algorithm using an
autoregressive AR(1) model during parameter estimation,
assuming the same correlation structure for each voxel. The
ReML estimates were then used to whiten the data. These
subject-specific models were used to compute four contrast
images per subject (partner’s neutral face, partner’s painful face,
unknown neutral face, unknown painful face), each representing
the estimated amplitude of the hemodynamic response in one
experimental condition. Contrast images from all subjects of the
two groups (inward and outward) were entered at the second level
into a random-effects model repeated-measures 26262A N O V A
with non-sphericity correction (as implemented in SPM5). For
interaction analyses and direct comparisons of the two groups a
26262 factorial design was used: a group factor (inward-
outward), a painful facial expressions factor (painful-neutral
faces) and a ‘‘familiar’’ facial expressions (partner’s-unfamiliar
faces). Across all analyses, the statistical threshold was set at
p,0.001 uncorrected with an extent threshold of 8 contiguous
voxels. Fisher’s LSD test was used for post-hoc comparisons. All
MNI coordinate spaces were converted to the Talairach
coordinate system by icbm2tal (http://brainmap.org/icbm2tal/).
Anatomic and Brodmann’s areas labeling of the activity of clusters
was performed with the Talairach Daemon database (http://www.
talairach.org/).
In order to investigate signal intensity of BOLD responses,
regions-of-interests (ROIs) were defined as spheres with 6 mm
diameter centered at the peak voxel in the activated clusters
identified in the 3-way interaction analysis. The parameter
estimates of signal intensity in ROIs were computed from the
first-level analysis in each participant and successively compared
with a repeated measures ANOVA, with four facial expressions as
within-effect factors and with dispositional affects as between-
subjects factors.
In order to evaluate any differences between groups for VAS
ratings intensity of the others’ pain and of their own feelings of
unpleasantness, a 26262 factorial design was used with the group
factor (PP-EDP), pain factor (painful-neutral faces) and familiarity
factor (partner’s-unknown faces). T tests were used to verify any
difference s between groups due to the familiarity factor in VAS
ratings of the intensity of others’ pain and of their own feelings of
unpleasantness. T tests were employed to evaluate any differences
between groups in questionnaires. Repeated measures ANOVAs
with dispositional affects as the between-subjects factor were
carried out to analyze any differences in reaction time and
performance accuracy.
Figure 1. Sample of visual stimuli: actors’ neutral and painful facial expression.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015268.g001
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Demographics and questionnaires
T tests and x
2 indicated that the two groups of subjects were
well matched for age, gender, parental education and years of
education (all p.0.2). T tests of the IRI scores only revealed a
significant difference between groups for one subtest, ‘‘Perspective
Taking’’ (PT), which measures the reported tendency to
spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others in
everyday life (t-value =23.65 df=28 p,0,001): the EDP group
had higher PT scores than the PP group (Table 1). Interestingly,
subjects in the PP group had higher scores than outward subjects
for the ‘‘Awareness of bodily processes’’ (ABP) subtest (t-value =
2.6 df=28 p,0.03) (Table 1). These results provide evidence that
the two groups have different questionnaire response rates: the PP
group was more likely to be aware of bodily processes and a less
prone to adopt another’s point of view, whereas the opposite
tendency was seen in the EDP group, i.e. more likely to adopt
another’s point of view and less likely to be aware of bodily
processes. T tests of the other questionnaires did not indicate any
significant difference between groups (df=28; NEO: t-value=0.5
p.0.62; TCI: t-value=1.67 p.0.11; PANAS: t-value=1.4
p.0.17; EPI: t-value=0.8 p.0.4; BFQ: t-value=1.96 p.0.06),
suggesting that the two groups of subjects did not significantly
differ on other aspects of personality identified by these
questionnaires (Table 1).
On the other hand, the VAS ratings ANOVA revealed that no
significant interactions occurred between the group factor, pain
factor and familiarity factor, in both the evaluation of pain
intensity in others and in the personal experience of unpleasant-
ness when observing others’ pain. No significant differences due to
the familiarity factor were found between groups in VAS ratings of
the intensity of others’ pain or in participants’ own feelings of
unpleasantness.
In addition, in a repeated measures ANOVA with the
dispositional affects factor as the between-subjects factor showed
no differences between the two groups in terms of reaction time
and performance accuracy.
Neuroimaging Results
First of all, the main effects of pain, familiarity and affective-
cognitive style factors were investigated. Observing pain in others
(painful faces.neutral faces) caused activation in the right
dorsolateral prefrontal gyrus (BA 46) (DLPFC), left cerebellum
and right red nucleus (p,0.001 uncorrected) (Table 2). In contrast,
the main effect of the familiarity factor [partner’s faces.unknown
faces] was associated with activation of the right inferior frontal
gyrus (BA9), the right medial prefrontal cortex (BA10) and the left
posterior cingulate cortex (BA31) (p,0.001 uncorrected) (Table 2).
Previous studies have found these same areas to be involved in
cognitiveand emotionalprocessing of pain empathy and familiarity.
The main effect of the affective-cognitive style was interesting to
observe, as the group factor produced a significant effect. Indeed,
activity in the left posterior insula (BA13) and the right parietal lobe
(BA40) (SI) (p,0.001 uncorrected) was greater in the PP group;
whereas in the EDP group, the BOLD response was greater in the
bilateral DLPFC (BA9), bilateral precuneus (BA7) and left posterior
cingulate cortex (BA23) (PCC) (p,0.001 uncorrected) (Figure 2,
Table 3). Interestingly, in the PP group, greater activation was seen
in those areas usually involved in the bodily states, even though no
real bodily experience was administered.
At this point, the three-way interaction between affective-
cognitive style, the observed facial expression, and the familiarity
of the face was explored. This interaction demonstrated
differential activity in the left insula (BA13) (x=241 y=24
z=10) at a more lenient threshold (p,0.01) (Figure 3a).
Moreover, the interaction also indicated differential activity in
left precuneus (BA31) (x=226 y=271 z=35; p,0.001)
(Figure 3b) and in the right mPFC (BA10) (x=11 y=60 z=25;
p,0.001) (Figure 3c, Table 3). ANOVA analyses of parameter
estimates from these clusters indicated greater activity in the left
insula for the PP group during processing of partners’ painful
expressions and of strangers’ neutral expressions. On the other
hand, in the EDP group, the left precuneus was more engaged and
the right mPFC (BA10) was less deactivated during processing of
partners’ painful expressions and of strangers’ neutral expressions
(Figure 3a, 3b, 3c). This finding suggests that a significant
Table 2. Main effects of pain and familiarity factors p,0.001 uncorrected, k=8.
MNI coordinates
Main effect Region x y z k Z Scores
Pain.Neutral Right BA46 middle frontal gyrus 49 22 15 275 5.57
Left BA9 middle frontal gyrus 252 19 25 243 5.26
Left anterior cerebellum 245 245 230 46 4.66
Right BA22 temporal gyrus 56 245 25 108 4.55
Left BA38 superior temporal gyrus 234 4 230 46 4.52
Right Amygdalau 26 28 225 3.9
Right Midbrain red nucleus 8 219 215 41 4.32
Partner.Unfamiliar Right BA9 inferior frontal gyrus 49 19 20 103 5.03
Right BA10 medial frontal gyrus 8 71 5 249 4.44
Left BA31 posterior cingulate cortex 28 252 30 188 4.42
Left BA47 inferior frontal gyrus 245 22 220 74 4.07
Left BA37 middle temporal gyrus 245 264 15 50 3.80
Unfamiliar. Partner Left BA3 parietal gyrus 238 219 45 90 3.85
usame cluster.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015268.t002
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differences observed among the participants.
Discussion
The present study investigated the relationship between
affective-cognitive styles and insula reactivity during affective
empathic responses to the directly perceived feelings of others.
For this purpose, visual stimuli depicting partners’ and unknown
faces, in both painful and neutral situations, were presented to two
groups of healthy participants, categorized according to their
affective-cognitive style, inward (phobic prone) or outward (eating
disorders prone).
The results suggest that affective-cognitive style is associated
with differential insula reactivity to painful facial expressions.
Imaging data revealed that the involvement of the insular region
Figure 2. 3D rendering (image threshold at p,0.05 FWE corrected) of the BOLD response of the main effects of group factor.
Significant activation: INWARD: left posterior insula BA13, and the right parietal lobe SII BA40; OUTWARD: bilateral DLPFC BA9, bilateral precuneus
BA7. 2-D overlay with multiple slices of insular activation in each group.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015268.g002
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categorized according to their affective-cognitive styles. Interaction
analyses demonstrated that different brain regions were more
involved in each group, particularly while processing partners’
painful facial expressions. Indeed, in PP subjects, more activation
was seen in the left posterior insula, whereas EDP subjects had
greater engagement in the left precuneus and mPFC.
Up to the present, several studies have provided results that
assign a key role to the insula during the direct experience of pain
and during a vicarious experience of another person’s pain [47–
53,69–74]. These studies significantly contributed to the develop-
ment of the current topic concerning insular cortex engagement in
emotions [47–50]. Concerning the individual differences issue in
pain empathy [54–55], our results suggest that dispositional affects
act upon the neural regions that subserve the ability to appreciate
others’ pain. At least two conclusions can be drawn from this fact.
First, the role played by the insular cortex in the affective response
to others’ pain is central for a certain cohort of people. Secondly,
the engagement of the insula in emotional experiences is
modulated by dispositional affects.
A primary interoceptive representation of the physiological
condition of the body has been shown to exist in the posterior
insular cortex [40,75–76]; thereby it is involved in human feelings
[41–44]. As suggested by Craig’s studies, a phylogenetically new
homeostatic afferent pathway from lamina I, through the
thalamus, to the posterior insular cortex provides a direct
representation of homeostatic afferent activity that engenders
distinct bodily feelings such as pain and visceral sensations [44,76].
Thus, it seems that the regions with more activity in the PP group
engage first-order mapping structures like the posterior insula and
the somatosensory cortex/SI- recipients of signals from the
internal milieu and the viscera [40,44,75–83]. These results are
consistent with the theoretical construct of inwardness described
by our model [18–20]. As they are more aware of the changes in
bodily states occurring during emotions and feelings, these subjects
had greater involvement of an area such as the posterior insula
associated with regulating bodily states.
In contrast, the EDP group had greater activation in fronto-
posterior parietal areas, such as the medial prefrontal cortex and
the precuneus, while processing partners’ painful facial expres-
sions. The role of the precuneus has been demonstrated in
processing self-relevant contextual information [84–88], in atten-
tion tracking [88–89], and in attentional non spatial shifts [90]. On
the other hand, the mPFC/BA10 as a whole plays a role in self-
referential processing [87,91–94] and social cognition [39,95]. It
has also been suggested that the mPFC/BA10 influences the
attentional balance between self-generated and perceptual infor-
mation, rather than being exclusively involved in processing self-
generated information [96]. Thus, the precuneus (and intercon-
nected posterior cingulate) and medial prefrontal cortices are
engaged in continuous information gathering and representation
of the self and the external world (‘‘co-perception’’), as well as in
the assessment of self-relevant sensations [87–88,91,97–98]. Such
results seem to be consistent with our model’s of outwardness, as
these subjects preferentially use an externally-anchored coordinate
system as a reference frame during emotions and feelings.
The greater response in the left insula in the PP group to
unfamiliar neutral faces, and in the left precuneus and right mPFC
in the EDP group, could be related to the processing of the
emotional significance of ambiguous stimuli when making a
judgment [99]. This speculation is supported by the observation
that both groups had similar BOLD responses.
Table 3. Inter-group comparisons p,0.001 uncorrected, k=8.
MNI coordinates
Main effect of group Region x y z k Z Scores
Phobic prone .
Eating disorders prone Left BA13 insula 238 0 5 105 6.53
Left BA19 inferior occipital gyrus 245 279 5 29 6.53
Left BA41 temporal transversus gyrus 260 222 10 276 6.22
Right BA40 parietal lobe 68 222 20 35 6.18
Left Cerebellum posterior lobe 230 271 225 80 5.59
Eating disorders prone .
Phobic prone Right BA9 middle frontal gyrus 49 22 35 554 6.47
Left BA4 precentral gyrus 226 215 75 15 6.30
Right cerebellum anterior lobe 15 252 25 506 6.27
Left BA9 middle frontal gyrus 245 19 35 182 6.19
Left BA7 precuneus 222 245 50 56 6.15
Left BA4 precentral gyrus 264 28 35 73 5.85
Right BA18 lingual gyrus 4 282 25 153 5.85
Left BA8 medial frontal gyrus 28 49 35 24 5.68
Left BA23 posterior cingulate cortex 0 234 20 43 5.24
Right BA7 precuneus 26 249 55 21 5.14
3-way interaction Left BA13 insulau 241 24 10 8 3.01
Left BA31 precuneus 226 271 35 11 3.56
Right BA10 medial frontal cortex 11 60 25 8 3.11
up,0.01 uncorrected, k=8.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015268.t003
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 December 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 12 | e15268The activation of different regions for the two groups cannot be
attributed to dispositional variables such as sensitivity to pain
expression: the two groups did not differ in their ratings of the
intensity of pain in others or in their personal feelings of
unpleasantness when observing others’ pain. Moreover, behavioral
data support the inter-group differences: PP subjects scored higher
on indexes of internal body perceptions on the on the ‘‘Awareness
of Bodily Processes’’ questionnaire [58], while EDP subjects scored
higher on indexes of ‘‘Perspective Taking’’ questionnaire [57].
It is interesting to note that our results are in line with those of
Critchley’s study [79] which used a synchronized or desynchro-
nized heartbeat tone signal in contrast with a series of ten similarly
timed tones that either did or did not include an oddball tone. In
this study, the interaction between desynchronized timing and
interoceptive attention highlighted several regions including the
precuneus and posterior insula. These regions are directly involved
in interoceptive attention and exteroceptive attention. Interesting-
ly, the engagement of the precuneus was greater when one person
was in a painful situation caused by another individual, that is to
say, when attention was focused on the social context [100].
One limitation of this study was the insula sub-threshold
activation reached in the interaction analysis. It should be viewed
in the context of the significant main effect of the group factor.
In conclusion, all these findings indicate that affective-cognitive
styles play a key role in explaining individual differences in insula
reactivity when observing partners’ painful facial expressions. As
predicted, during cerebral processing of emotions, imaging in the
PP group demonstrated a greater engagement of the posterior
insula, which is involved in mapping of internal bodily and
subjective feeling states. Evidence exists that the insula plays an
important role in connecting emotional experience with intero-
ceptive states [24–25,82–83]. Beyond what was expected, imaging
in the EDP group demonstrated activation in those regions that
are engaged in continuously gathering and visualizing concurrent
information on the self and the external world (co-perception).
Other than offering new insights into individual differences in
the pain empathy issue, these new data shed new light on the
variability in neural networks of emotion [44], and on the
approach to the emotional embodiment issue [10,101–104].
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